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RECENT CASES
OFFICERS- RIGHT OF DE JURE OFFICER TO PAYMENT OF SALARY AFTER
PAYMENT TO DE FACTO OFFICER. - Plaintiff was re-elected as a member of
the Board of Supervisors for Polk County, Iowa for a three year term con-
mencing January 1, 1947. He served until August 15, when an action was com-
menced against him asking for his removal for misconduct in office. The peti-
tion alleged the plaintiff's indictment by the county grand jury on the charges of
obtaining money by false pretences. On that date, under authority granted by
statute, an order was entered suspending him from office. The vacancy, for the
balance of the term of office, was filled by two qualified individuals, both of
whom received full compensation for their services. The criminal actions
against the plaintiff were later dismissed upon appeal. Subsequently on
December 17, 1949, he filed a motion to set aside the order of suspension.
When Polk County denied his claim for the salary, be brought suit in equity.
The court although refusing to set aside the order of suspension, holding it
to be moot, entered a decree for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme
Court stated that the interpretation to be given to the applicable statute'
was the controlling factor in the case. The court, two justices dissenting, held
that the plaintiff's right to recovery was not barred by the payment of the
salary to the de facto incumbents holding office during the plaintiff's suspension.
Hild v. Polk County, 49 N.W. 2d 206 (Iowa 1951).
Public offices are not considered as a grant,2 or contract, 3 nor are they
considered to be for the benefit of the individuals who occupy them.4 They
are instead deemed to be public trust,5 or agencies, G to be held for the bene-
fit of. the public and are in the nature of a privilege. 7 Accordingly laws
granting compensation to public officers should be strictly construed in
favor of the government where the enactment admits of two interpretations,8
resulting in an ambiguity.
1. Iowa Code §66.9 (1950) "An order of the district court or of a judge thereof
suspending a public officer from the exercise of his office, after the filing of a petition
for the removal from office of such officer, shall, from the date of such order, automatically
suspend the further payment to said officer of all official salary or compensation until said
petition has been dismissed, or until said officer has been acquitted on any pending
indictments charging misconduct in office." (Emphasis added).
2. State v. District Court, 122 Mont. 464, 206 P.2d 166 (1949); State v. Barthalow,
150 Ohio St. 499, 83 N.E.2d 393 (1948); 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §514
(2d. ed. 1939); See Black v. Sutton, 310 Ky. 247, 191 S.W.2d 407, 408 (1945).
3. Black v. Sutton, 310 Ky. 247, 191 S.W.2d 407 (1945); Board of Education v.
State Board of Education, 115 N.J.L. 67, 178 Atl. 208 (1935); State v. Barthalow, 150
Ohio St. 499, 83 N.E.2d 393 (1948); See Cornett v. City of Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 563,
56 S.W.2d 742, 743 (1933).
4. In re Olson, 211 Minn. 114, 300 N.W. 398 (1941); Winslow v. Minto, 164 Ore.
495, 102 P.2d 919 (1940); 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corportaions, §436 (2d ed. 1939).
5. In re Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, 22 N.E.2d 49 (1939); In re Olson,
211 Minn. 114, 300 N.W. 398 (1941); Simmons v. Elizabeth City, 197 N.C. 404, 149
S.E. 875 (1929).
6. Walton v. Davies, 188 Ga. 56, 2 S.E.2d 603 (1939); Simmons v. Elizabeth City,
197 N.C. 404, 149 S.E. 375 (1929).
7. The privilege is considered a political rather than a civil right. See State v. Irby,
190 Ark. 786, 81 S.W.2d 419 (1935) (conviction of embezzlement with subsequent
presidential pardon which restored civil rights did not restore political privileges); Reese
v. Dempsey, 48 N.M. 417, 152 P.2d 157 (1944) (privilege is, within limitations, protected
by law).
8. Marin County v. Messner, 44 Cal. App.2d 577, 112 P.2d 731 (1941), Nodaway
County v. Kidder, 344 Mo. 795, 129 S.W.2d 857 (1939) (officer claiming compensation
must point out statute entitlig him to compensation); State v. O'Hem, 104 Mont. 126,
65 P..2d 619 (1937) (compensation must be authorized by statute otherwise presumption
is that services were intended to be gratuitous).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The problem concerning the rights of a de jure officer to collect his salary
for a certain period during which a salary was paid to a de facto officer,
who performed the duties of his office, has no single answer. Most states,
where the question has arisen, have held that payment to a de facto in-
cumbent will prevent the de jure officer from recovering from the political
-subdivision concerned. 9
The basic reasons enunciated for the majority rule are: (1) that rendition
of official services must precede the right to demand and recover compensa-
tion attached to the office,1 (2) to withhold the salary of a public officer
pending a judicial determination would impair the efficiency of the public
services,1 1 (3) it would be unjust to require the municipality to assume the
obligation of bringing the salary into court, and pray that the de facto and
de jure officers interplead,12 (4) and there exists a right to rely on the ap-
parent title of the de facto office holder.13
Notable exceptions to the majority view exist where there had been bad
faith in paying the de facto officer,1 4 or where the purported de facto officer
was a usurper without color of title,15 or when the de facto officer was paid
after a judicial decision favorable to the de jure officer.1 6 Furthermore pay-
ment to the de facto officer is no defense when made in violation of a stat-
ute,17 nor is the defense of payment applicable unless recovery by the de jure
officer would result in a duplication of payment for the same office.1s Many
states, through judicial determination 19 or by statutory enactment, 20 have
adopted the view that the majority rule cannot be applied to a case of wrong-
ful removal.
9. E.g., Irwin v. Jefferson County, 228 Ala. 609, 154 So. 589 (1934); Walker v.
Hughes, 42 Del. 447, 36 A.2d 47 (1944) (de facto officer takes salary at his peril
and must account to de jure officer for salary received during the wrongful tenure);
McKinley v. Chicago. 369 Ill. 268, 16 N.E.2d 727 (1938) (court indicated that rule
applies equally to elected publin officials and positions of employment). But see Sweetnam
v. Board of Police Com'rs., 56 Cal. App. 644, 206 Pac. 102, 104 (1922).
10. Bowlin v. Franklin County, 152 Miss. 534, 120 So. 453 (1929).
11. City of Peru v. State, 210 Ind. 668, 199 N.E. 151 (1935) (apparently on the
theory that such a withholding would be against public policy).
12. Stearns v. Sims, 24 Okla. 623, 104 Pac. 44 (1909).
13, Coughlin v. McElroy, 74 Conn. 397, 50 Atl. 1025 (1902); Bowlin v. Franklin
County; 152 Miss. 534, 120 So. 453 (1929).
14, Talmadge v. Cordell, 167 Ga. 594, 146 S.E. 467 (1928) (in addition to bad
faith the court pointed out two additional exceptions: (1) where the full complement
-of officers has not been appointed and (2) where there has been no specific appointment
made in place of the rightful officer). See Markus v. City of Duluth, 138 Minn. 225,
164 N.W. 906, 908 (1917); Mechem, Public Officers, §332 (1890).
15, City of Ardmore v. Sayre, 54 Okla. 408, 154 Pac. 356 (1915).
16. Corbett v. Chicago, 391 Il1. 96, 62 N.E.2d 693 (1945); Clausen v. Fond Du
Lac County, 168 Wis. 432, 170 N.W. 287 (1919).
17, Dotson v. Cassia County, 35 Idaho 382, 206 Pac. 810 (1922); Idaho Code
:59-504 (1947) "When the title of the incumbent of any office in this state is
contested by proceedings instituted in any court for that purpose, no warrant can there-
after be drawn or paid for any part of his salary until such proceedings have been
finally determined."
18. City of Tulsa v. Coker, 181 Okla. 291, 73 P.2d 443 (1937).
19. E.g., City of Phoenix v. Sittenfeld, 53 Ariz. 263, 88 P.2d 83 (1939); People v.
'Thompson, 316 Ill. 11, 146 N.E. 473 (1925).
20. Devlin v. City of Trenton, 126 N.J.L. 563, 19 A.2d 812 (1941); N.J. Rev. Stat.
§40:46-34 (1937) "Whenever a municipal officer or employee, including any policeman
or fireman, has been or shall be illegally dismissed from his office or employment, and
such dismissal has been or shall be judicially declared illegal, he shall be entitled to
recover the salary of his office or employment for the period covered by the illegal
dismissal."
RECENT CASES
A substantial number of states have consistently refused to follow the
majority rule. Instead they have held payment to the de facto officer does
not bar the de jure claimant from recovering his salary.21 This view is predi-
cated on the belief that the salary should follow the "title" to the office.22
Iowa, in 1904, adopted the majority view in holding that a de jure officer
after obtaining possession of the office, could not recover from the county
the salary paid to the de facto officer.23 In subsequent years the majority
view has been applied to policemen, - 4 sanitary inspectors, -5 and an employee
of the Iowa State Highway Commissions,2 G all of whom, upon reinstatement,
were denied back pay. The instant case, in departing from the aforemen-
tioned decisions, rests upon the failure of the applicable statute 27 to state
that dismissal works a forfeiture of the salary. In reply, the dissenting jus-
tice stated, "What constitutes a good defense to plaintiff's claim is not the
order of suspension but the fact that plaintiff never performed the duties
of the office . . ." 2 It is submitted that the apparent ambiguity, as to the
legislative intent, should be resolved in favor of the firmly established rule.
Such an adjudication would relieve the taxpayer, through his municipal cor-
poration, from the onerous duty of paying twice for the same service.
WILLIAM E. PORTER
PLEADING - INSURANCE - SUBROGEE - INSURER REQUIRED TO SUE IN OWN
NAME WHERE INSURED WAS INDEMNIFIED IN FULL.- During trial of an
action resulting from an automobile collision, the defendant sought to file
an amended answer asserting that the nominal plaintiff was not the real
party in interest. This proposed amendment alleged that the named plain-
tiff had already been indemnified in full by insurance and that all rights
accruing to that plaintiff from the collision bad been transferred to the in-
surance company through assignment and subrogation. Counsel for the
defense contended that only the insurer retained a beneficial interest in the
matter. Therefore, maintained the defense, the suit could not be prosecuted
in the name of the insured. This argument convinced the North Dakota
Court which held that the proposed amended answer alleged facts which,
if true, went to the merits of the case and justified allowing the amendment.
The court stated that when an insurance company has paid the injured
party's damages in full, and the latter has assigned to the insurer his entire
right of action, only the insurer has a sufficient interest in the matter at
issue to support an action. Hermes v. Markham, 49 N.W. 2d 238 (N.D. 1951).
This case brought North Dakota one step closer to a clearly defined policy
21. E.g., Andrews v. Portland, 79 Me. 485, 10 Atl. 458 (1887); Ness v. City of
Fargo, 64 N.D. 231, 251 N.W. 843 (1933); Cooke v. Roberts, 335 Pa. 561, 7 A.2d
357 (1939).
22. Ness v. City of Fargo, 64 N.D. 231, 235, 251 N.W. 843, 844 (1933) "The salary
of a public official is an incident to the office, and the legal right to receive or enforce
the payment thereof goes with the legal title to the office."
23. Brown v. Tama County, 122 Iowa 745, 98 N.W. 562 (1904) (further held that
per diem payments to de facto officer out of public treasury did not alter the rule).
24. Harding v. Des Moines, 193 Iowa 885, 188 N.W. 135 (1922).
25. Glenn v. Chambers, 48 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 1951).
26. McClinton v. Melson, 232 Iowa 543, 4 N.W.2d 247 (1942).
27. See note 1, supra.
28. Hild v. Polk County, 49 N.W.2d 206, 212 (1951).
